Android Verified Boot 2.0
This file contains information about the current support of Android Verified Boot 2.0 in U-Boot.
Overview
Verified Boot establishes a chain of trust from the bootloader to system images:
Provides integrity checking for:
Android Boot image: Linux kernel + ramdisk. RAW hashing of the whole partition is done and the hash is compared with the one stored in the VBMeta image
system
/vendor
partitions: verifying root hash of dm-verity hashtrees
Provides capabilities for rollback protection
Integrity of the bootloader (U-Boot BLOB and environment) is out of scope.
For additional details check [1].
AVB using OP-TEE (optional)
If AVB is configured to use OP-TEE (see Enable on your board) rollback indexes and device lock state are stored in RPMB. The RPMB partition is managed by OP-TEE (see [2] for details) which is a secure OS leveraging ARM TrustZone.
AVB 2.0 U-Boot shell commands
Provides CLI interface to invoke AVB 2.0 verification + misc. commands for different testing purposes:
avb init <dev> - initialize avb 2 for <dev>
avb read_rb <num> - read rollback index at location <num>
avb write_rb <num> <rb> - write rollback index <rb> to <num>
avb is_unlocked - returns unlock status of the device
avb get_uuid <partname> - read and print uuid of partition <part>
avb read_part <partname> <offset> <num> <addr> - read <num> bytes from
partition <partname> to buffer <addr>
avb read_part_hex <partname> <offset> <num> - read <num> bytes from
partition <partname> and print to stdout
avb write_part <partname> <offset> <num> <addr> - write <num> bytes to
<partname> by <offset> using data from <addr>
avb read_pvalue <name> <bytes> - read a persistent value <name>
avb write_pvalue <name> <value> - write a persistent value <name>
avb verify [slot_suffix] - run verification process using hash data
from vbmeta structure
[slot_suffix] - _a, _b, etc (if vbmeta partition is slotted)
Partitions tampering (example)
Boot or system/vendor (dm-verity metadata section) is tampered:
=> avb init 1
=> avb verify
avb_slot_verify.c:175: ERROR: boot: Hash of data does not match digest in
descriptor.
Slot verification result: ERROR_IO
Vbmeta partition is tampered:
=> avb init 1
=> avb verify
avb_vbmeta_image.c:206: ERROR: Hash does not match!
avb_slot_verify.c:388: ERROR: vbmeta: Error verifying vbmeta image:
HASH_MISMATCH
Slot verification result: ERROR_IO
Enable on your board
The following options must be enabled:
CONFIG_LIBAVB=y
CONFIG_AVB_VERIFY=y
CONFIG_CMD_AVB=y
In addtion optionally if storing rollback indexes in RPMB with help of OP-TEE:
CONFIG_TEE=y
CONFIG_OPTEE=y
CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB=y
CONFIG_SUPPORT_EMMC_RPMB=y
Then add avb verify
invocation to your android boot sequence of commands,
e.g.:
=> avb_verify=avb init $mmcdev; avb verify;
=> if run avb_verify; then \
echo AVB verification OK. Continue boot; \
set bootargs $bootargs $avb_bootargs; \
else \
echo AVB verification failed; \
exit; \
fi; \
=> emmc_android_boot= \
echo Trying to boot Android from eMMC ...; \
... \
run avb_verify; \
mmc read ${fdtaddr} ${fdt_start} ${fdt_size}; \
mmc read ${loadaddr} ${boot_start} ${boot_size}; \
bootm $loadaddr $loadaddr $fdtaddr; \
If partitions you want to verify are slotted (have A/B suffixes), then current
slot suffix should be passed to avb verify
sub-command, e.g.:
=> avb verify _a
To switch on automatic generation of vbmeta partition in AOSP build, add these lines to device configuration mk file:
BOARD_AVB_ENABLE := true
BOARD_AVB_ALGORITHM := SHA512_RSA4096
BOARD_BOOTIMAGE_PARTITION_SIZE := <boot partition size>
After flashing U-Boot don’t forget to update environment and write new partition table:
=> env default -f -a
=> setenv partitions $partitions_android
=> env save
=> gpt write mmc 1 $partitions_android